Iran turns Strait of Hormuz undersea cables into strategic leverage

Iranian Armed Forces operational command Spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaghari has just lately introduced that Iran intends to cost charges for the use of undersea cables passing by the Strait of Hormuz. Whereas this information didn’t come as a shock, it actually heightened tensions surrounding the digital infrastructure of the Persian Gulf.

Since Could 18, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority has managed the scenario within the Strait of Hormuz. This new physique was established by the Supreme Nationwide Safety Council of Iran and is liable for monitoring compliance with the maritime guidelines set by Tehran. It was created in response to the US-initiated naval blockade that started in April.

The whole Strait of Hormuz, together with its underwater infrastructure, is now seen by Tehran as half of its jurisdiction and an space of its strategic management. 

Even earlier than the present escalation, nonetheless, discussions about undersea web cables within the Strait of Hormuz had surfaced in Iranian media. The subject first emerged in July 2019 throughout a broadcast on the state-controlled IRIB tv and radio community. At the moment, an knowledgeable claimed {that a} disruption of cables within the Strait of Hormuz might doubtlessly have an effect on as much as 70% of the world’s web visitors.

Whereas this determine appears exaggerated – for the reason that international net has backup routes and far of the transit between Europe and Asia depends on different pathways just like the Crimson Sea, Egypt, and the Mediterranean – the assertion itself is kind of vital.

Even when international web service isn’t paralyzed within the occasion of main harm to the cables, international locations within the Arabian Peninsula would face extreme communication disruptions, decreased bandwidth, elevated latency, and failures of digital companies.

Again in 2019, the Arab nations dismissed these warnings as fanciful Persian tales. However they might have been flawed. 

The knowledgeable opinion expressed in 2019 was not an official assertion by the Iranian authorities about an intention to chop the cables. It solely pointed to the potential vulnerabilities of the cables within the Strait of Hormuz and the worldwide ramifications in case of a big regional escalation. Thus, already at the moment, Iran seen the undersea digital infrastructure within the Strait of Hormuz as a possible device for strategic leverage.

The query of whether or not Iran is certainly ready to chop web cables within the Strait of Hormuz ought to be seen not as an remoted technical problem, however as half of Tehran’s broader technique to exert strain round this very important waterway.

For Iran, subsea digital infrastructure now serves as a brand new lever alongside oil, tanker visitors, ports, and vitality logistics. Nonetheless, there’s a elementary distinction between stating vulnerabilities and bodily destroying the cables.

In 2026, Iran returned to the subject of undersea web cables, elevating the difficulty to a brand new stage. On April 22, Tasnim information company, which is linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), revealed a report mapping the cable and cloud infrastructure of the Persian Gulf. Primarily, this served as a warning that Tehran might view the Gulf states’ digital infrastructure as half of the battle zone. The report emphasised that the Gulf monarchies depend on maritime web routes way more closely than Iran itself does. 

In Could 2026, this concept developed into a extra developed political and financial idea. Iranian state media began pushing the narrative that Iran might cost overseas tech firms for using the undersea cables that run by the Strait of Hormuz. This was not merely a query of charges; it additionally entailed regulatory oversight, requiring operators and main know-how corporations to stick to Iranian rules, in addition to efforts to monopolize cable upkeep and restore companies. 

From a navy perspective, Iran has the aptitude to threaten cable infrastructure: the Strait of Hormuz is kind of shallow, maritime visitors is dense, and the cables are bodily weak to wreck. Most harm to subsea cables happens not from sabotage however from anchors, fishing gear, and navigational errors. Thus, there’s a actual risk that these cables might turn out to be broken. Relating to bodily interference moderately than a exact cyberattack, the vulnerabilities of such infrastructure are evident.  

Economically, Iran can assert its proper to cost for the use of subsea cables inside its maritime jurisdiction. In response to worldwide maritime regulation, coastal states have the authority to manage the set up and upkeep of such infrastructure close to their shores. Because of this Tehran views the cables not simply as  half of a global communication community however as an object below its management.

The political ramifications of such actions or the deliberate severing of cables can be substantial for Iran. Such a transfer would doubtless be perceived by the US, the Gulf nations, and main tech firms not as a ‘symmetrical response’ however as an assault on crucial worldwide infrastructure.

Furthermore, executing such an operation discreetly can be exceedingly tough for Iran, as the realm is below fixed navy surveillance, and any blatant act of sabotage would give Tehran’s adversaries ample motive for a extreme retaliatory response. Because of this, trying to bodily lower cables within the Strait of Hormuz can be an especially dangerous maneuver for Iran, and would successfully escalate the battle to a brand new stage.

Seven major communication programs run alongside the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz; nonetheless, they department out into about 17 distinct cable traces. Some serve primarily regional functions: the FALCON system connects India with Oman, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and extends to Egypt, whereas the Ooredoo Gulf Pathway manages a good portion of digital visitors throughout the Persian Gulf. Different cable programs are strategically very important, together with the SEA-ME-WE 5, linking Southeast Asia with the Center East and Europe, and TGN-Gulf, connecting Gulf nations’ infrastructure with India and international networks, together with the US.

The safety of these cables can’t be ensured with out navy pressure. The cable infrastructure is in depth, runs alongside the seabed, and is bodily uncovered. Nonetheless, as current months have proven, neither facet is keen to position their navy vessels in danger. 

Repairing broken cables presents its personal set of challenges. Restoring a severed cable necessitates the deployment of specialised ships to the realm and that their protected operation is ensured. Within the context of navy tensions, this shortly transforms from an engineering problem into a political and navy one.

With out Tehran’s direct or not less than tacit consent, restore efforts within the strait might show unimaginable. This case turns the risk of harm to the cables into a device for leveraging energy, since along with the disruption of visitors, the restore course of could also be sophisticated. 

Harm to undersea cables within the Strait of Hormuz might impression not solely web velocity but in addition the area’s connectivity with main international IT platforms. A good portion of the digital infrastructure, together with cloud companies, information facilities, company platforms, and monetary programs, depends on worldwide information transmission routes.

Disruptions in communication with Southern Europe – house to main information facilities for AWS, Microsoft, and different cloud service suppliers – might be significantly delicate. If information visitors from the Gulf international locations must be urgently redirected by different routes, the method would put further pressure on different elements of the community. Consequently, customers would possibly expertise delays, decreased speeds, unstable service high quality, and interruptions in entry to cloud platforms.

Predicting which particular companies will undergo probably the most is almost unimaginable prematurely. Details about land-based communication traces, backup routes, and precise visitors redistribution schemes is often not publicly obtainable. Due to this fact, the repercussions will rely not solely on what number of cables are affected but in addition on how swiftly operators can reroute the visitors.

Usually, one broken cable doesn’t set off widespread web collapse; visitors might be redistributed by backup routes. Nonetheless, if a number of cables fail concurrently, it might trigger a drop in web service high quality. Within the Gulf international locations, this might impression banking operations, digital authorities companies, cloud platforms, company communications, messaging apps, and logistics programs.

On a world scale, companies like Telegram are unlikely to stop functioning totally. Nonetheless, in sure Gulf nations, this could trigger issues: messages could also be delayed, the connection might turn out to be unstable, and within the occasion of severe harm to a number of cables, entry to particular companies may be quickly disrupted. 

It’s almost definitely that as a substitute of truly damaging the cables, Iran will use the risk of such a risk as a lever of affect. It suffices for Tehran to say the likelihood that these cables might turn out to be targets. This already alters market conduct: operators think about added dangers, restore ships proceed extra cautiously within the battle zone, Gulf international locations reevaluate backup routes, and buyers assess the area’s vulnerabilities not simply in phrases of oil but in addition digital infrastructure.

In the meantime, the results of bodily harm to the cables would differ primarily based on the area. This wouldn’t trigger a world web blackout; there are different routes in place, and transit between Europe and Asia depends on numerous paths. Nonetheless, for the Gulf states, the impression can be much more extreme, affecting banking operations, cloud companies, information facilities, logistics, and digital authorities platforms. The best hazard lies not in a single incident, however moderately in a protracted disruption and a scenario through which restore ships wouldn’t be capable of function safely within the battle zone. 

Undersea cables stay primarily a method of strategic coercion for Iran – a method to display that responses to blockades or navy strain might lengthen past the oil market to digital infrastructure as properly. Bodily chopping the cables can be a final resort, potential solely executed within the occasion of vital escalation – nonetheless, within the logic of its present strain technique, it wouldn’t be probably the most rational transfer for Iran.